Documento de Trabajo

Welfare in models of trade with heterogeneous firms

I illustrate that the welfare improvement property of the Melitz model is due to the shape of the aggregate labor demand curve, which slopes upwards. By slightly changing some assumptions in the model, this curve may have a negative slope. In this case, increases in aggregate productivity result in a reduction in welfare. For example,

Information Asymmetries and an Endogenous Productivity Reversion Mechanism

Several empirical studies suggest that the systematic behavior of lending standards, with laxer (tighter) standards applied during expansions (recessions) are responsible for reverting trends in aggregate productivity. We build a dynamic screening model with informational asymmetries in credit markets that rationalizes the observed dependence of lending standards on economic fundamentals and generates reversion of output

Firm-Provided Training and Labor Market Policies

This paper studies firm-provided training in the presence of the following labor market policies: minimum wages, unemployment benefits, firing costs, and severance payments. I show that in high minimum wage economies, a more intense use of labor market policies reduces firm-provide training, while in low minimum wage economies, this may result in more training. The

Emerging Markets Variance Shocks: Local or International in Origin?

We examine the source of permanent shocks to the variance of a set of emerging and developed markets. By using the ICSS algorithm, Bai-Perron (2003)’s test for structural breaks in mean level, and wavelets, and analyzing weekly data for 18 countries over the January 1996 – April 2006 period, we find significant numbers of variance

Economic performance, creditor protection and labor inflexibility

We present a static general equilibrium model of an economy with agents with heterogeneous wealth and endogenous credit constraints created by partial loan recovery rates. Higher loan recovery rates and better bankruptcy protection increase output and credit penetration, while the former raises the average interest rate spread and the latter decreases it. We also study

Loyalty inducing programs and competition with homogeneous goods

We analyze a market where two firms producing a homogenous good compete by means of two mechanisms: prices and a loyalty bonus. We assume that firms act simultaneously when posting their loyalty bonus and prices. Consumers who purchase from a firmin the first period must return the bonus in case they switch providers in the

Local social capital and geographical mobility. A theory

In this paper, we attempt to understand the determinants of mobility by introducing the concept of local social capital. Investing in local ties is rational when workers anticipate that they will not move to another region. Reciprocally, once local social capital is accumulated, incentives to move are reduced. Our model illustrates several types of complementarity leading

On the planner’s loss due to lack of information in bayesian mechanism design

In this paper we study a large class of resource allocation problems with an important complication, the utilization cost of a given resource is private information of a profit maximizing agent. After reviewing the characterization of the optimal bayesian mechanism, we study the informational cost introduced by the presence of private information. Our main result

Política comercial estratégica en el mercado aéreo chileno

Se estudia la política comercial desde un punto de vista estratégico. En particular interesa examinar las condiciones bajo las cuales es apropiada una política de reciprocidad (a diferencia de una apertura unilateral). La política de reciprocidad se basa en la idea que el país con el que se negocia un acuerdo estará más dispuesto a

Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs

We study a game that models a market in which heterogeneous producers of perfect substitutes make pricing decisions in a first stage, followed by consumers that select a producer that sells at lowest price. As opposed to Cournot or Bertrand competition, producers submit a price function to the market, which maps their production level to

A large firm model of the labor market with entry, exit and search frictions

I augment the standard large-firm matching model with a firm process of entry and exit. This extension requires the analysis of firm-level dynamics, which I present in this note. I also show the equivalence of the model with the one-worker firm model from Pissarides (2000).
JEL: J63.

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for