Proyectos

Permiso para Crecer y el Desafío Productivo en Chile

En este trabajo se describe y analiza el sistema de permisos para la inversión en Chile. Estos permisos, que buscan resguardar materias tan relevantes como la salud y seguridad ciudadanas, si están mal diseñados o implementados pueden transformarse en una barrera al desarrollo, incluso sin cumplir su objetivo público primordial. En particular, el sistema de

Desarrollo Urbano de Santiago: Perspectivas y Lecciones

El desarrollo urbano es fundamental para el bienestar de los individuos. En Chile, sin embargo, a menudo las políticas públicas urbanas han sido diseñadas de acuerdo con criterios arbitrarios y omitiendo hechos relevantes. En parte, ello se debe a que la evidencia empírica no está disponible en un formato sistematizado. Este trabajo tiene tres objetivos:

Private Finance of Public Infrastructure

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an organizational form to provide public infrastructure. A key characteristic of PPPs is that private investors participate directly in individual infrastructure projects. The advantage of private finance is that it may improve incentives. However, private finance typically neither frees public funds, nor enlarges the pool of viable projects.
Private

Platform Price Parity Clauses and Consumer Obfuscation

Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unitary search cost faced by consumers, I show when it is profitable for platforms to obfuscate consumers

Efectos de la Reforma del Código de Aguas

When and How to Use Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure: Lessons from the International Experience

In the last 30 years public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as a new organizational form to provide public infrastructure. Governments find them attractive because PPPs can be used to avoid fiscal check-and-balances and increase spending. At the same time, PPPs can lead to important efficiency gains, especially for transportation infrastructure. These gains include better maintenance,

The Political Class and Redistributive Policies

Corvalan, Alejajandro, «The Political Class and Redistributive Policies«, with P.Querubin and S.Vicente. Forthcoming, Journal of the European Economic.

The gender gap in college major choice in Chile

Mizala, Alejandra. “The gender gap in college major choice in Chile”. Economics of Education, Review 77, 2020, with P. Bordon and C. Canals.

Delegating Learning

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning delegation as

Financing PPP Projects with PVR Contracts: Theory and Evidence from the UK and Chile

Risk allocation is an essential component of a successful public-private partnership contract financed with user fees. For many of these projects, demand risk is large and mostly exogenous. This suggests that we evaluate contract designs that do not force the concessionaire to bear risk it cannot manage. In this paper we study present-value-of-revenue (PVR) contracts,

Renegotiations and Corruption in Infrastructure: The Odebrecht Case

In 2016, Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht was fined $2.6 billion by the US Department of Justice (DOJ). According to the plea agreement, between 2001 and 2016 Odebrecht paid $788 million in bribes in 10 Latin American and two African countries in more than 100 large projects. The DOJ estimated that bribe payments increased Odebrecht’s profits by

Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
  Economic Literature Classification